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Abstract—In this work we examine the performance of a
Location Spoofing Detection System (LSDS) for vehicular net-
works in the realistic setting of Rician fading channels. In the
LSDS, an authorized Base Station (BS) equipped with multiple
antennas utilizes channel observations to identify a malicious
vehicle, also equipped with multiple antennas, that is spoofing
its location. After deriving the optimal transmit power and the
optimal directional beamformer of a potentially malicious vehicle,
robust theoretical analysis and detailed simulations are conducted
in order to determine the impact of key system parameters on the
LSDS performance. Our analysis shows how LSDS performance
increases as the Rician K-factor of the channel between the BS
and legitimate vehicles increases, or as the number of antennas at
the BS or legitimate vehicle increases. We also obtain the counter-
intuitive result that the malicious vehicle’s optimal number of
antennas conditioned on its optimal directional beamformer is
equal to the legitimate vehicle’s number of antennas. The results
we provide here are important for the verification of location
information reported in IEEE 1609.2 safety messages.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless networks the integrity of location information
is of growing importance. As such, the authentication (or
verification) of location information has attracted considerable
research interest in recent years [1–7]. In many circumstances
the device (client) itself obtains its location information di-
rectly (e.g., via GPS), and the wider network can only achieve
the client’s location information through requests to the client.
In such a context, the client can easily spoof or falsify its
claimed location in order to disrupt some network functionality
(e.g., geographic routing protocols [8], or directional access
control protocols [9]). The adverse effects of location spoofing
can be more severe in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
due to the possibility of life-threatening accidents. Less criti-
cally, a malicious vehicle could spoof its location in order to
seriously disrupt other vehicles [10] or to selfishly enhance
its own functionality within the network [11]. The integrity
of claimed location in VANETs is therefore important, and
motivates the introduction of an LSDS to that scenario. Within
IEEE 1609.2 revocation of certificates belonging to malicious
vehicles will occur [12] - an LSDS will form part of the
revocation logic.
Recently, many location spoofing detection protocols for
VANETs have been proposed (e.g., [13–15]). In [13], the
authors proposed an autonomous and cooperative scheme for
detecting and mitigating false claimed locations by exploiting
specific properties of VANETs, such as high node density and
mobility. The authors of [14] developed a location spoofing
detection algorithm by comparing the claimed location with a
neighbor table consisting of other vehicles’ identifications and
locations. To overcome the non line-of-sight (LOS) problem
in location verification systems, a cooperative algorithm was
proposed in [15]. Some generic location spoofing detection
algorithms (not dedicated to VANETs), were also proposed
in recent years (e.g., [3–6]). These algorithms utilize some
observations such as Received Signal Strength (RSS), Time of
Arrival (TOA), and Angle of Arrival (AOA), and performance
analysis of these algorithms were provided under specific
observation models.
However, the following question has not been explored in
the literature. How does the performance of an LSDS depend
on the proportion of the channel which is LOS? In the VANET
environment it is highly likely that a vehicle possesses some
LOS component towards a BS for the majority of its travel
time. As such, answering the above question in the context
of VANETs is important, and forms the thrust of the work
presented here. In order to investigate the above question,
we consider Rician fading channels in which the Rician K-
factor is defined as the ratio between the power of the LOS
component and the power of other scattered components.
We utilize the complex signals measured by an authorized
multiple-antenna BS to verify a claimed location of a vehicle
that is equipped with multiple antennas, and infer whether the
vehicle is legitimate (reporting its true location) or malicious
(spoofing its claimed location). Adopting a practical threat
model, in which the on-road malicious vehicle keeps some
minimum distance away from its claimed location, we analyze
the performance of our LSDS. In order to guarantee fairness,
we also determine the optimal transmit power and the optimal
directional beamformer for the malicious vehicle to minimize
the detection rate. Our analysis demonstrates that our LSDS
works well even when the Rician K-factor is low (e.g., −3dB),
and that detection performance increases as the Rician K-
factor of the channel between the legitimate vehicle and the
BS increases. We also obtain a counter-intuitive observation,
that the malicious vehicle can minimize the detection rate by
setting its number of antennas equal to the legitimate vehicle’s
Fig. 1. Illustration of the VANETs application scenario of interest.
number of antennas when it adopts the optimal directional
beamformer. This is counter-intuitive since a priori one would
have thought it would be optimal to set the number of antennas
as large as possible.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Assumptions
The VANETs application scenario of interest is illustrated
in Fig. 1, where the BS, the legitimate vehicle, and the
malicious vehicle are each equipped with a uniform linear
array (ULA) with NB , NL, and NM elements, respectively.
In this figure, the “Protected Region” is the area where a
vehicle (legitimate or malicious) claims to be. The BS is to
verify whether the vehicle is indeed at his claimed location
or not based on wireless channel observations. If the vehicle
passes such a verification, a specific action will follow in
the “Legal Region” (e.g., a traffic light turns green). The
“Falsehood Region” indicates the minimum distance between
the claimed location and the malicious vehicle’s location. The
malicious vehicle is inside the “Illegal Region” while it claims
that it is inside the “Protected Region” in order to bring
some selfish benefits (e.g., it keeps the traffic light green in
advance for itself). We adopt the polar coordinate system as
shown in Fig. 2, where the location of the BS is selected
as the origin, the legitimate vehicle’s location is denoted as
xL = (dL, θL), and the malicious vehicle’s location is denoted
as xM = (dM , θM ). We assume that the claimed location is
the same as the legitimate vehicle’s location (i.e., xL is also the
claimed location of the legitimate or malicious vehicle). We
adopt a practical threat model, in which the distance between
xM and the malicious vehicle’s claimed location xL is larger
than a predetermined threshold rm, i.e., |xM − xL| ≥ rm.
The orientation of the BS ULA is aligned with the x-axis,
which is publicly known. The orientations of the ULAs of the
legitimate and malicious vehicles are under the control of the
legitimate and malicious vehicles, respectively, i.e., the angles
ψL and ψM as shown in Fig. 2 are under the control of the
legitimate and malicious vehicles, respectively.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the orientations of the three ULA antennas and the
geometry of the BS, legitimate vehicle, and malicious vehicle.
B. Channel Model
With no loss of generality, we assume the legitimate channel
(legitimate vehicle-to-BS) and the malicious channel (mali-
cious vehicle-to-BS) are subject to Rician fading. Then, the
NB ×NL legitimate channel matrix is given by
H =
√
KL
1 +KL
Ho +
√
1
1 +KL
Hr, (1)
where KL is the Rician K-factor of the legitimate channel, Ho
is the LOS component of the matrix, and Hr is the scattered
component of the matrix. The entries of Hr are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d) circularly-symmetric complex
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance.
Denoting ρB as the space between two antenna elements of
the ULA at the BS, Ho is given by Ho = rTLtL, where rL
and tL are defined as
rL = [1, · · · , exp(j(NB − 1)τB cos θL)] , (2)
tL = [1, · · · , exp(j(NL − 1)τL cosψL)] , (3)
and T denotes the transpose operation. In (2) and (3), we have
τB = 2πf0ρB/c and τL = 2πf0ρL/c, where f0 is the carrier
frequency, c is the speed of propagation of the plane wave, and
ρL is the space between two antenna elements of the ULA at
the legitimate vehicle.
The NB ×NM malicious channel matrix is given by
G =
√
KM
1 +KM
Go +
√
1
1 +KM
Gr, (4)
where KM is the Rician K-factor of the malicious channel,
Go is the LOS component of the matrix. Gr is the scattered
component of the matrix and is a matrix with i.i.d circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero
mean and unit variance. Go can be written as Go = rTMtM ,
where rM and tM are given by
rM = [1, · · · , exp(j(NB − 1)τB cos θM )] , (5)
tM = [1, · · · , exp(j(NM − 1)τM cosψM )] , (6)
In (6), we have τM = 2πf0ρM/c, where ρM is the space
between two antenna elements of the ULA at the malicious
vehicle.
C. Observation Model
Throughout this work we denote the null hypothesis where
the vehicle is legitimate as H0 and denote the alternative
hypothesis where the vehicle is malicious as H1. The NB × 1
complex observation vector received from the legitimate vehi-
cle (under H0) is given by
y =
√
PLg(dL)Hbs+ nL, (7)
where PL is the transmit power of the legitimate vehicle, g(dL)
is the path loss gain given by g(dL) = (c/4πf0d0)2 (d0/dL)η,
d0 is a reference distance, η is the path loss exponent, b
is the beamformer adopted by the legitimate vehicle which
satisfies ‖b‖ = 1, s is the publicly known pilot symbol
(without loss of generality we assume s = 1), and nL is the
additive white Gaussian noise vector, of which the entries are
i.i.d circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variables
with zero mean and variance σ2L. We note that b and PL
are under the control of the legitimate vehicle. We assume
that the legitimate vehicle cooperates with the BS to facilitate
the verification procedure. To this end, the legitimate vehicle
sets b = t†L/‖tL‖ to maximize |tLb|, where † denotes
the conjugate transpose operation. In addition, the legitimate
vehicle sets its transmit power to that required by the BS
(we assume PL is publicly known). As per (7), the likelihood
function of y conditioned on a known s under H0 is
f(y|H0)= 1
πNB det(R0)
exp
[−(y−m0)†R−10 (y−m0)] , (8)
where m0 and R0 are the mean vector and covariance matrix
of y under H0, respectively, which are given by
m0 =
√
PLg(dL)KLNB
1 +KL
rTL , (9)
R0 =
(
PLg(dL)
KL + 1
+ σ2L
)
INB . (10)
Likewise, the complex observation vector received from the
malicious vehicle (under H1) is given by
y =
√
PMg(dM )Gps+ nM , (11)
where PM is the transmit power of the malicious ve-
hicle, g(dM ) is the path loss gain given by g(dM ) =
(c/4πf0d0)
2
(d0/dM )
η
, p is the beamformer adopted by the
malicious vehicle which satisfies ‖p‖ = 1, and nM is the
additive white Gaussian noise vector, of which the entries are
i.i.d circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variables
with zero mean and variance σ2M . As per (11), the likelihood
function of y under H1 for given xM , PM , and p is
f(y|xM , PM ,p,H1)
=
1
πNB det(R1)
exp
[−(y−m1)†R−11 (y−m1)] , (12)
where m1 and R1 are the mean vector and covariance matrix
of y under H1, respectively, which are given by
m1 =
√
PMg(dM )KM
1 +KM
Gop, (13)
R1 =
(
PMg(dM )
KM + 1
+ σ2M
)
INB . (14)
We note that xM , PM , and p are under the control of the
malicious vehicle. We will discuss in the next section how the
malicious vehicle sets these parameters so as to minimize the
detection rate.
III. LOCATION SPOOFING DETECTION SYSTEM
In this section, we first present the decision rule adopted
in our LSDS. We then discuss the attack strategy of the
malicious vehicle (e.g., how to set xM , PM , and p) in order to
minimize the detection rate. Finally, we analyze the detection
performance of our LSDS based on the malicious vehicle’s
attack strategy.
A. Decision Rule of the LSDS
We adopt the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) as the decision
rule of our LSDS. This is due to the fact that the LRT
achieves the highest detection rate (the probability to detect
a malicious vehicle) for any given false positive rate (the
probability to detect a legitimate vehicle as malicious) [16].
The LRT decision rule is given by
Λ (y) ,
f (y|xM , PM ,p,H1)
f (y|H0)
D1≥
<
D0
λ, (15)
where Λ (y) is the likelihood ratio of y, λ is the threshold
corresponding to Λ (y), and D0 and D1 are the binary deci-
sions that infer whether the vehicle is legitimate or malicious,
respectively. Given the decision rule in (15), the false positive
and detection rates of an LSDS are functions of λ. The
specific value of λ can be set through predetermining a
false positive rate, minimizing the Bayesian average cost, or
maximizing the mutual information between the system input
and output [5]. In this work, we adopt the false positive rate,
Pr (Λ (y) > λ|H0), and detection rate, Pr (Λ (y) > λ|H1), as
the core performance metrics for our LSDS. In addition, we
adopt the minimum total error as the unique performance met-
ric in order to investigate the impact of key system parameters
on the performance of our LSDS.
B. Attack Strategy of the Malicious Vehicle
We assume the malicious vehicle knows all the information
known by the BS or the legitimate vehicle. We first discuss
how does the malicious vehicle set its true location xM . Since
there is only one BS in our LSDS, the difference between dL
and dM can be eliminated by the malicious vehicle through
adjusting its transmit power PM . This is the reason why a
single BS cannot detect location spoofing attacks based on the
RSS of a channel. As such, we assume the malicious vehicle
sets xM by minimizing the difference between θM and θL
under the constraint |xM−xL| ≥ rm. Then, the adopted value
of xM can be obtained through
x∗M , (d
∗
M , θ
∗
M ) = argmin
|xM−xL|≥rm
|θM − θL|. (16)
Given the application scenario of interest as shown in Fig. 1,
we assume that x∗M is known to the BS. The average signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) of a channel can be readily estimated.
As such, we assume that the malicious vehicle adjusts its
transmit power to make sure that the average SNR of the
malicious channel is the same as that of the legitimate
channel, i.e., γM = γL, where γL = PLg(dL)/σ2L and
γM = PMg(dM )/σ
2
M . Therefore, the transmit power of the
malicious vehicle conditioned on xM is given by
P ∗M (xM ) =
PLg(dL)σ
2
M
g(dM )σ2L
. (17)
We next discuss how does the malicious vehicle sets its
beamformer p, which is the key vector controlled by the
malicious vehicle. The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence from
f (y|xM , PM ,p,H1) to f (y|H0) is defined as
DKL (f (y|xM , PM ,p,H1) ||f (y|H0))
=
∫
ln Λ(y)f (y|xM , PM ,p,H1) dy. (18)
As per (18), we know that the KL divergence is also the
expected log likelihood ratio when the alternative hypothesis
is true. Based on (15), we also know that the larger the KL
divergence, the more evidence we have for the alternative
hypothesis [17]. As such, the malicious vehicle is to minimize
the KL divergence presented in (18) in order to minimize the
detection rate. Substituting (8) and (12) into (18), we have
DKL (f (y|xM , PM ,p,H1) ||f (y|H0)) = tr(R−10 R1)−NB
−ln
(
detR1
detR0
)
+ (m0−m1)†R−10 (m0−m1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
fD(p)
. (19)
As per (19), we know that only the term fD (p) is a function of
p. As such, the optimal p is the one that minimizes fD (p).
Given the format of R0 presented in (10), we can see that
fB (p) is minimized when ‖m0 − m1‖ is minimized. A
constraint on our solution is that we assume the malicious
vehicle adopts a directional beamformer, the direction of
which is chosen (see below) so as to minimize detection. The
rationale for this assumption is that it allows the attacker to
optimize his solution based on only one parameter (allowing
rapid in-the-field decision making), and allows for a clarity
of exposition. The format of our directional beamformer p is
given by
p =
1√
NM
[1, · · · , exp(j(NM − 1)τM cosϕ)]T , (20)
where ϕ is the beamforming direction. Then, the optimal
beamforming direction ϕ (the value of ϕ that minimizes the
detection rate) conditioned on xM and PM can be obtained
through
ϕ∗(xM , PM ) = argmin
ϕ∈[0,π]
‖m0 −Kp‖ , (21)
where K =
√
PMg(dM )KM/(1 +KM )Go. Substituting
ϕ∗(xM , PM ) into (20), we obtain the optimal directional
beamformer of the malicious vehicle, denoted as p∗(xM , PM ).
We note that p∗(xM , PM ) may not be the globally optimal
beamformer (only near-optimal) for the malicious vehicle due
to the imposition of the one-parameter solution (ϕ) of (20) in
obtaining p∗(xM , PM ).
C. Detection Performance of the LSDS
Without loss of generality, we first analyze the detection
performance of our LSDS for a general xM . Obviously, the
malicious vehicle will optimize its transmit power PM and its
beamformer p for a given xM . As such, the following analysis
is for PM = P ∗M (xM ), and p = p∗ [xM , P ∗M (xM )]. In order
to derive the false positive and detection rates in closed-form
expressions, we further assume σ2L = σ2M and KL = KM
such that R0 = R1. We would like to highlight that these
assumptions are practical since the malicious vehicle will not
be very far from its claimed location in order to keep a low
detection rate. Also, as we show later the detection rate is
minimized when KL = KM , i.e., KL = KM is the best case
for the malicious vehicle. We will also assume the system
knows KL, through a predetermined measurement campaign
in the vicinity of the BS. In principle, knowledge of KL could
be replaced by a pdf which is then encapsulated within the
LSDS decision framework. Substituting (8) and (12) into (15),
the LRT decision rule can be rewritten as
T(y)
D1≥
<
D0
Γ, (22)
where T(y) is the test statistic given by
T(y) = 2Re{[m∗1(xM )−m0]†R−10 y}, (23)
Γ is the threshold for T(y) given by
Γ=lnλ+ Re{[m∗1(xM )−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(xM )+m0]}, (24)
m∗1(xM ) is given by
m∗1(xM ) =
√
PLg(dL)KL
1 +KL
Gop
∗ [xM , P
∗
M (xM )] , (25)
and Re{} denotes the real part of a complex number. Then,
we derive the false positive rate, α(λ,xM ), and the detection
rate, β(λ,xM ), of the LSDS in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The false positive and detection rates of the
LSDS for a given xM are given by
α(λ,xM )=Q

 lnλ+ [m
∗
1(xM )−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(xM )−m0]√
2[m∗1(xM )−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(xM )−m0]

 ,
(26)
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β(λ,xM )=Q

 lnλ− [m
∗
1(xM )−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(xM )−m0]√
2[m∗1(xM )−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(xM )−m0]

 ,
(27)
where Q(x) = 12π
∫∞
x
exp
(
− t22
)
dt.
Proof: As per (23), we derive the distributions of the test
statistic T(y) under H0 and H1 as follows
T(y)|H0 ∼ N
(
2Re{[m1(xM )−m0]†R−10 m0},
2[m∗1(xM )−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(xM )−m0]
)
, (28)
T(y)|H1 ∼ N
(
2Re{[m1(xM )−m0]†R−10 m1(xM )},
2[m∗1(xM )−m0]†R−10 [m∗1(xM )−m0]
)
. (29)
As per the decision rule in (22) and the definitions of the false
positive and detection rates, we obtain the desirable results in
(26) and (27) after some algebraic manipulations.
The minimum total error conditioned on a xM can be
expressed as [19]
ǫ(xM ) = 1− β(λ,xM ) + α(λ,xM ). (30)
We note that the detection performance of the LSDS based
on x∗M can be obtained by substituting x∗M into our derived
performance metrics. We also note that a decision similar to
(22) can be obtained for the case where R0 6= R1. Under
this case, the false positive and detection rates cannot be
obtained in closed-form expressions since the distribution of
the corresponding test statistic is intractable. However, we can
utilize a similar methodology presented in [20] to approximate
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the distributions of the test statistics in order to obtain the
approximations of the false positive and detection rates. Due
to the limited space, we left such analysis for further work
and we investigate the detection performance of the LSDS
for R0 6= R1 through numerical simulations in the following
section.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first present numerical simulations to
verify the accuracy of our provided analysis. We also provide
some useful insights on the impact of the SNR of the legitimate
channel, the location of the malicious vehicle, number of
antennas (i.e., NB , NL, NM ), and Rician K-factors (i.e., KL,
KM ) on the detection performance of our LSDS.
In Fig. 3, we present the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve of our LSDS. In this figure, we first observe
that the Monte Carlo simulations precisely match the theoretic
results, which confirms our analysis provided in Theorem 1.
We also observe that the ROC curves for γL = 5dB dominate
the ROC curves for γL = 0dB. This observation demonstrates
that the detection performance of the LSDS increases as the
legitimate vehicle’s transmit power increases. This is due to
the fact that the impact of the channel noise will be relatively
suppressed by increasing the transmit power. As expected,
we further observe that the ROC curve shifts towards the
left-upper corner as |θ∗M − θL| increases. This demonstrates
the necessity to guarantee a minimum distance between the
malicious vehicle’s claimed location and its true location.
In Fig. 4, we present the minimum total error versus the
number of antennas at the malicious vehicle (NM ) of our
LSDS. As expected, we first observe that the minimum total
error decreases as NB or NL increases. This is due to the fact
that the more antennas the legitimate or the BS is equipped
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with, the more beamforming gain we can achieve for the
legitimate channel. In addition, it is interesting to observe that
the minimum total error is maximized when NM = NL for
arbitrary NB . This shows that the optimal number of antennas
utilized by the malicious vehicle to minimize the detection rate
is the same as the number of antennas at the legitimate vehicle.
This indicates that if the malicious vehicle is equipped with
more antennas than the legitimate vehicle, its attack strategy is
to use the same number of antennas as the legitimate vehicle,
not to use all of its antennas. In practice, we do not know the
number of antennas equipped at the malicious vehicle, but this
observation suggests that we can assume NM = NL for the
attack strategy of the malicious vehicle.
In Fig. 5, we present the simulated minimum total error
versus the Rician K-factor of the malicious channel (KM ) of
our LSDS. As expected, we first confirm that for KL = KM
the minimum total error decreases as KM (or KL) increases.
In addition, it is interesting to observe that the minimum total
error is maximized when KM = KL for arbitrary KL. This
indicates that the malicious vehicle’s attack strategy is to select
a true location that is in an environment similar to that of
its claimed location (so that KM is close to KL) to launch
location spoofing attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigated the detection performance
of an LSDS for VANETs with a single BS in Rician fad-
ing channels. We first determined the malicious vehicle’s
true location based on a given VANETs scenario and then
determined the optimal transmit power and the optimal di-
rectional beamformer for the malicious vehicle to minimize
the detection rate. Our analysis first shows that the LSDS
performance increases as the Rician K-factor of the legitimate
channel, the number of antennas at the BS, or the number of
antennas at the legitimate vehicle increases. We also obtained
a counter-intuitive observation that the malicious vehicle’s
optimal number of antennas is equal to the legitimate vehicle’s
number of antennas. Finally, we showed that the Rician K-
factor of the malicious channel that minimizes the detection
rate is identical to the Rician K-factor of the legitimate
channel.
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